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before they may utilize the U.S. Declaration to bring the United States before
the Court.
Third, in proviso (c) the Working Group decided to exclude disputes relating
to collective action. In the judgment of the Working Group, legal challenges to
collective actions should require a broader jurisdictional basis than the acceptance
by the United States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Judicial review
of collective actions would advance the rule of law, but the Court's review would
be effective only if both the responsible institution and all affected states participate in the process. Such a process would require both rethinking of the basis
for collective action and amendment of the Statute of the Court. 6
Finally, the Working Group decided to retain the six months' notice provision of
the 1946 Declaration, but to insert into that provision a requirement of reciprocity.
Respectfully submitted,
James H. Carter
Chair
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II. International Criminal Court*
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association recommends that the
United States Government take an active role in the establishment of an international criminal court that would be based on the following principles:
A. The consensual jurisdiction of the international criminal court should be based
on the consent of the state having custody over a person accused of a crime
specified in an international convention which
(1) adequately defines the crime;
(2) has been widely accepted by states representing all of the world's major
legal systems; and
(3) contains the extradite or prosecute obligation.
B. The mandatory jurisdiction of the international criminal court should be based
on a decision by the Security Council issued pursuant to its powers under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:
(1) determining that any person or category of persons who have participated
in an activity that the Security Council had determined endangers international peace and security and have been accused of having committed a

6. Article (34)1 of the Statute of the Court provides: "Only states may be parties in cases
before the Court."
*The members of the working group on an international criminal court are listed in Appendix A.
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crime which is recognized by the international community as a gross
violation of a rule of customary international law widely accepted by
states representing all the world's major systems as giving rise to personal
responsibility, should be subject to possible prosecution and trial in accordance with the statute of the court; or
(2) transferring to the court for possible prosecution and trial any person
who has participated, or is participating, in an activity which the Security
Council determined endangers international peace and security and who
is accused of having committed a crime under general international law
or an international treaty in force, when a state where the accused person
is found refuses to try or extradite that person.
REPORT
This recommendation is the second in a series of five recommendations which
deal with important issues of international law that are crucial to the maintenance
of international peace and security and justice. They have been developed by
the Section of International Law and Practice, through its Working Group on
Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, as a contribution of the American Bar Association to the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, in fulfillment
of the American Bar Association's Goal VIII-to advance the rule of law in
the world. This recommendation addresses the issue of the establishment of an
International Criminal Court for the punishment of individuals responsible for
gross violations of international law.
Since the American Bar Association (ABA) considered the first report of the
ABA Task Force on an International Criminal Court (Task Force) and the report
of the International Law and Practice Section's (Section) Task Force on the
International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia (War Crimes Task Force), the International Law Commission (ILC) of
the United Nations has issued a new report, the U.S. Commission on Improving
the Effectiveness of the United Nations (U.S. Commission) has issued its report,
and the United States and other countries are expected to make submissions for
the upcoming session of the ILC. The final report of the ABA Task Force has
also presented some additional comments on the ILC's report. All of these documents cite new and critical issues which require an adjustment and elaboration
of positions previously taken by the ABA.
It is vitally important for the United States to take an active role in the establishment of an international criminal court able to contribute to the maintenance of
the rule of law, without which there can be no just peace. If the United States
does not take a leading role in the formation of the new institution, it may evolve
in a direction that departs widely from concepts that are fundamental to a system
of justice.
For these reasons, the Section strongly believes that any proposal for an internaSUMMER 1995
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tional criminal court should be comprehensive in addressing issues fundamental
to its effective operation. The United States should not support a vague proposal
which would leave open for future action the development of jurisdictional and
procedural issues. In particular, sufficiently detailed rules of evidence and procedure are fundamental to the integrity of any system of criminal justice, and are
necessary to ensure the rights of the accused and the victim and to prevent the
politicization of the tribunal. The salient aspects of the structure of a tribunal
and its procedures may be subject to comment by the Section in a future report.
Consensual Jurisdiction
The Section is of the view that the parties to the statute of an international
criminal court should have two means of invoking its jurisdiction: consensual
and mandatory. In the first instance, offenders would be voluntarily surrendered
by states. A party to the statute of an international criminal court would be entitled
to refer the case of an alleged criminal found in its territory to the tribunal instead
of trying or extraditing that person, either on its own initiative, or on request
of the state where the crime has been committed or of the state of the accused
person's nationality. An international tribunal would, in effect, serve as a third
alternative to states currently having only the choice to prosecute or extradite
international criminals found within their country.
The Section does not support the inclusion of a provision that would preclude
reference of a case to an international criminal court when there has been a
request by another state for extradition of an accused. The only alternative to
extradition would be for the requested country to submit the accused to its prosecutorial authorities. This would undermine a fundamental purpose of having an
international criminal court, which is to maximize possible prosecutorial options
in respect to international crimes.
In this regard, the Section would support the position taken in the commentary
to Article 63 of the ILC's draft statute as to whether a state party that decided
not to surrender an accused to the court should also be allowed as an alternative
to prosecution to extradite him to another state for prosecution. Allowing a state
party three options-prosecution, extradition to another state, or surrender to the
court-would seem the approach most compatible with the view that the court
should complement, rather than compete with, prosecution before national tribunals. The Section concurs with the position taken by the U.S. Commission that
the establishment of an international criminal court "should be viewed not as a
substitute for but a complement to national criminal systems and other modalities
of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in penal matters. "
Under its consensual jurisdiction, reference to an international criminal court
should be made on a case-by-case basis. As to whose consent should be required
for the court to have jurisdiction, consent should be required only of the state
with custody over an accused, provided that the state of custody would have a
VOL. 29, NO. 2
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basis under the pertinent international convention for exercising jurisdiction. It
is recognized that this position is inconsistent with the first report of the ABA
Task Force and the ILC's draft statute, where the consent of the state or states
of which the accused is a national would also have been required. However, it
is consistent with the positions taken by the Task Force in its final report and
by the ILC's working group.'
What the Section now recommends is not different from the status quo today
where the consent of the state having custody controls. Under existing conventions, normally the state of custody is obliged to establish its jurisdiction over
the offense so it can submit an accused to prosecution if it does not extradite
him to either the territorial state or the state of nationality. Since neither the state
in which the crime occurred, nor the state of nationality, nor the state of custody
requires the consent of any other state to submit an accused to prosecution before
its national courts, such consent should not be required for such states to submit
an accused to an international criminal court.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
While the Section supports an international criminal court with broad subjectmatter jurisdiction, it recognizes that the breadth of subject-matter jurisdiction
may ultimately be dictated by political developments. Depending upon the circumstances, a more modest and incremental approach may have a greater likelihood
of success. Accordingly, the subject matter of consensual jurisdiction would
initially be limited to international conventions that are widely accepted by states
representing all of the world's major legal systems and that are subject to an
extradite or prosecute obligation. A list of such conventions is contained in Article
22 of the ILC's draft statute.
In terms of which crimes a state is prepared to recognize as within the court's
jurisdiction, an "opting in" system along the lines set forth in alternative A of
Article 23 of the ILC's draft statute is preferred. A state party to the court's
statute could "by declaration lodged with the Registrar, at any time accept the
jurisdiction over one or more of the crimes referred to in article 22." This
approach would be the most flexible and the one most commensurate with the
concept that the court would serve as a supplemental forum to national courts
for the prosecution of international crimes.
The Section recommends against inclusion of the crime of "aggression," which
is not defined in any international convention. The only officially adopted definition of aggression is that contained in General Assembly Resolution 3314, adopted
in 1974, which though considered by many as a generally accepted interpretation
of the U.N. Charter, is considered by others as intended only as a political guide
1. For further discussion, see the Final Report of the American Bar Association Task Force
on an International Criminal Court at 21-26.
SUMMER 1995

304

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

and not a suitable definition for purposes of prosecution. In a similar regard,
apartheid is another issue which may have more political than legal content and
raise the risk of politicization of the court. Finally, the Section recommends
against reference to the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in Article 21 of the ILC's draft statute as a possible addition to the list.
Some items in that code have engendered strongly negative reactions.
The Section is of the view that drug-related crimes should be considered for
inclusion in the court's subject-matterjurisdiction. However, drug-related crimes,
including the crimes referred to in the 1988 United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, do not at present qualify
for inclusion in the ILC's draft statute because of a lack of adequate definition.
If such crimes are to be included, they should be more precisely defined in the
court's statute.
In terms of what crimes should be added to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
court, the Section would encourage the addition of torture to Article 22 of the draft
statute of the ILC. Consideration should also be given to crimes covered by the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to crimes against
UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers under proposed new treaty law.
Mandatory Jurisdiction
Unlike the U.S. Commission, the Section considers that provision should be
made for a second means of invoking the jurisdiction of the international criminal
court. It would be mandatory in nature and would require a mandate from the
Security Council issued pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter:
a. determining that any person or category of persons who have participated in
an activity that the Security Council had determined endangers international
peace and security and have been accused of having committed a crime
which is recognized by the international community as a gross violation
of a rule of customary international law widely accepted by states representing all the world's major systems as giving rise to personal responsibility
should be subject to possible prosecution and trial in accordance with the
statute of the court; or
b. transferring to the court for possible prosecution and trial any person who
is participating in an activity which the Security Council had determined
endangers international peace and security and who is accused of having
committed a crime under general international law or an international treaty
in force, when a state where the accused person is found refuses to try or
extradite that person.
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Respectfully submitted,
James H. Carter
Chair

